Introduction

This application note describes the error correction code (ECC) management and implementation on STM32H7 Series. This document presents both the hardware, and software aspects linked to the ECC mechanism used to protect content of internal memories. ECC protection with external memories is possible, however its implementation is out of the scope of this document.

This document presents general information about ECC protection, detailed hardware ECC fault management, and details on how ECC is implemented in the STM32H7 Series microcontrollers. This document proposes a specific implementation of the software part of the safety solution.

1 General information

This document applies to STM32H7 Series microcontrollers and are Arm®-based devices.

Note: Arm is a registered trademark of Arm Limited (or its subsidiaries) in the US and/or elsewhere.

1.1 Acronyms and definition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ECC</td>
<td>Error correction code</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPU</td>
<td>Central processing unit (part of the MCU)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRC</td>
<td>Cyclic redundancy check</td>
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<td>DED</td>
<td>Double-error detection</td>
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<tr>
<td>DTCM</td>
<td>Data-tightly coupled memory</td>
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<td>FAR</td>
<td>Falling address register</td>
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<td>ISR</td>
<td>Interrupt service routine</td>
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<tr>
<td>ITCM</td>
<td>Instruction tightly coupled memory</td>
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<tr>
<td>MCU</td>
<td>Microcontroller unit</td>
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<td>MDMA</td>
<td>Master direct-memory access</td>
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<td>POR</td>
<td>Power-on reset</td>
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<td>RAM</td>
<td>Random access memory</td>
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<td>SEC</td>
<td>Single-error correction</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRAM</td>
<td>Static RAM</td>
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2 ECC overview

The first ECC was invented by the mathematician Richard Hamming. The original Hamming code uses 7 bits to store 4 bits of information with redundancy bits used for correction, and detection of errors. In STM32H7 Series devices, both RAM and flash memories are protected using a SEC-DED algorithm based on Hamming principles, but improved with one extra parity bit. The ECC code is capable of detecting and correcting a single-bit error and of detecting a two-bit error in the stored word of data.

In SRAM volatile memory, a stray alpha particle may cause a bit value to flip either way. This is a constant threat and the probability of single-bit failure is the same regardless the age of the hardware. A single-bit or two-bit error failure is a problem especially in applications where large amount of data is stored for long periods of time without reset, for example a battery-powered data logger.

In flash memory, the data decays over time, especially at high temperatures. Storage temperatures have an impact on flash memory data, but cycling (programming) temperature has an even stronger impact. The flash memory can sustain only a certain amount of rewrites to each memory word, this leads to the need of implementation of wear leveling in case of data storage. The typical retention time and life cycle of flash memory for a given product is published in the product datasheet.

Both types of failures (single-bit error and two-bit error), are inevitable, but the correct use of the ECC can prevent data loss.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data word width</th>
<th>Number of redundancy bits</th>
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<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>128</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>256</td>
<td>10</td>
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</table>

2.1 ECC implications

ECC is a key element in embedded systems that aim to comply with requirements of safety standards such as IEC60730 Class C or IEC 61508 SIL2 and higher.

A system without hardware ECC may still meet target safety standards compliance but it requires a deployment of considerable software overhead. The use of ECC memory to increase the overall diagnostic coverage above 90% is easy to do and increases the system’s possibility to comply with high safety standards. Another advantage of using ECC is the potential improvement of security as ECC usage may lead to detection of hardware tampering.

2.2 RAM ECC

The RAM ECC functionality of the STM32H7 Series devices has a peripheral-like interface with registers for settings and with interrupts that permit a quick reaction to detected fault. All STM32H72x/H73x/H74x, and STM32H75x SRAM and instruction/data cache memories are protected with ECC. The data width is 64-bit for AXI-SRAM and for ITCM-RAM. All other volatile memories are accessed by 32-bit bus width (word size). On STM32H7Ax/H7Bx only the tightly coupled memories and instruction/data cache memories are protected with ECC. Other SRAM are not protected with ECC.
Table 3. SRAM ECC coverage in STM32H7 Series

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>H72x/H73x</th>
<th>H74x/H75x</th>
<th>H7Ax/H7Bx</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AXI</td>
<td>64b</td>
<td>64b</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITCM</td>
<td>64b</td>
<td>64b</td>
<td>64b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTCM</td>
<td>32b</td>
<td>32b</td>
<td>32b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRAM1</td>
<td>32b</td>
<td>32b</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRAM2</td>
<td>32b</td>
<td>32b</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRAM3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>32b</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRAM4</td>
<td>32b</td>
<td>32b</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Backup RAM</td>
<td>32b</td>
<td>32b</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The main difference between the RAM ECC compared to a regular peripheral is that the RAM ECC cannot be turned off. The ECC is powered and clocked along with the RAM and it is an integral part of the RAM interface. For example, backup SRAM can be disabled. This also disables the RAM ECC controller associated with it. The ECC is computed on data word. If a data smaller than word is written in the volatile memory, the modification is done on read-modify-write basis. On an incomplete access, the ECC does not write the value immediately. As it may be the very next byte or half word, it waits for the next write access. This is a common case in applications dealing with the backup SRAM. For example in an array of characters, energy is conserved. However, a write operation is not to be completed in case of reset (the memory contents is retained without the last incomplete word write).

The workaround for this limitation is to write a dummy incomplete word write after each regular one. The dummy write address must be within the same memory (backup SRAM in this case).
Figure 1. Unaligned access handling in preserved SRAM

```c
uint16_t myArray[3];
myArray[0] = 1;
myArray[1] = 2;
myArray[2] = 3;
RESET
uint16_t myArray[3];
RESET
```

Figure 2. RAM ECC controller interfaced with memory unit

RAM ECC controllers are assigned to each internal SRAM block. The controllers are divided among the three system domains: D1, D2 and D3. Diagnostics from all internal SRAM units/controllers are gathered into a global control block. This global control block has a set of configuration registers and a global interrupt signal with the possibility of event masking.
The particular RAM ECC controller assigned to a specific SRAM block checks the data integrity at each read access to that SRAM block. Some read access types are not obvious, as certain write include an implicit read phase. An example of not-obvious read access is an incomplete RAM write performed as a read/modify/write in two cycles. This can be either write of data smaller than RAM word, or an unaligned write.

2.3 Flash memory ECC

For STM32H72x/3x/4x/5x lines, the flash memory word (smallest programmable amount of memory) is 256 bits, while on STM32H7Ax/Bx lines it is 128 bits. This is also the portion of memory protected by the 10 ECC (9ECC bits for STM32H7Ax/Bx) bits required to achieve SEC and DED functionality on the flash memory word. Write access to any smaller unit of memory is only possible on read-modify-write basis, this action results in higher stress to the memory hardware. The STM32H7Ax/Bx line also features added robustness on the 1 kilobyte OTP area, where each 16 bits are protected with 6 bits of ECC redundancy. There is no OTP memory area on STM32H72x/3x/4x/5x and STM32H2x/3x/4x/5x lines.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>-</th>
<th>H72x/H73x/H750</th>
<th>other H74x/H75x</th>
<th>H7Ax/H7Bx</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bank1</td>
<td>256b</td>
<td>256b</td>
<td>128b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>256b</td>
<td>128b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special region</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16b</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The ECC functionality is integrated into the flash memory controller and cannot be disabled. If the application is not designed to take advantage of the ECC, it can disable the associated interrupt and ignore the flag bits in the flash memory status registers.

The disadvantage of an integrated ECC solution is that programming single bits in the flash memory word is not possible without prior erase of this word. As programming without erase is sometimes used by implementations of EEPROM emulation or a monotonic counter, another algorithm must be selected for such applications on STM32H7 Series MCUs.
The flash memory controller of STM32H7 Series implements also a hardware CRC integrity protection. The CRC is a complementary mechanism, not an ECC replacement. If the automated background CRC check is activated, the read access to the flash memory also implicitly checks the ECC in the whole range.

2.4 Cache memory ECC

Cache is a memory that does not have its own address range. Its purpose is to reduce the latency of accessing the addressed memory by preserving a copy of frequently accessed contents (either code of data) or contents which are likely to be needed soon (current address+1 for example). Physically it is an SRAM with different addressing.

By default, the Cortex®-M7 L1 cache is also protected by ECC by using the same SEC DED code. The word width is 256-bit as the entire line of cache is covered. The cache ECC protection can be disabled. To modify the state of the cache ECC, the code must first disable and flush the cache. Then the ECC settings can be modified and the cache re-enabled with new setting.

The CPU cache is only involved in AXIM bus accesses, the ITCM and DTCM address range does not require cache. The tightly coupled memories are almost exclusively dedicated to the use of the Cortex®-M7 core. The Cortex®-M7 processor can automatically recover from any detected ECC fault in instruction cache. One-bit errors are covered by the automatic correction. For two-bit errors, the line is invalidated and the instructions are loaded again from the program memory. In the case of data cache, a two-bit error detection may result in losing the ongoing modifications while reloading old data. Note that write through practice is not recommended as a countermeasure to this rare event.

The ART accelerator cache that supports the Cortex®-M4 core on dual-core STM32H7 Series devices is not protected by ECC.

As there is no failure notification or interface to ECC detection results of the CPU cache, the only solution to avoid the rare event of two-bit data cache ECC error is to manually periodically clean or even disable the cache. Flushing the cache periodically prevents the accumulation of more than one failing bit to single cache line. Disabling the cache may be extreme, but it is a valid preventive action when dealing with critical data.
3  

**ECC use in applications**

In order to correctly use the ECC capabilities, basic routines to deal with detected errors immediately must be implemented in the firmware. It is recommended to log and monitor the error presence for maintenance, failure prediction and hazard warning. This recommendation is especially important for safety and industrial applications.

3.1  

**Dealing with ECC errors in RAM**

Static volatile memory is based on a symmetric arrangement of unipolar transistors. The unipolar transistors flip between two states that represent a logical 0 or 1. The amount of energy necessary to make this transition is low, hence the device keeps a low-power consumption.

A stray alpha particle may cause that a bit in the RAM changes its stored value. If the ECC mechanism is not used properly, these rare errors may accumulate over time and cause a data damage or even a system failure. These events are random by nature and occurrence of error on some address does not provide any indication where or when the next error may occur.

3.1.1  

**Initialization**

When ECC is being used in the RAM, all memories that are to be accessed by the code must be initialized. A read access or an unaligned write to uninitialized memories is likely to trigger the ECC error due to the random initial setting of both the stored value and the redundant bits.

Any pattern is fine for the memory initialization. Find below a proposed list of steps to follow:

- **Step 1.** Proceed with RAM initialization after POR or after wakeup from Standby mode or after domain standby.
- **Step 2.** Clear the RAM ECC status register flags after RAM initialization.
- **Step 3.** Activate the ECC error latching. Even if optional, this action is important for subsequent correction of errors and for reliability errors.
- **Step 4.** Enable the interrupts for error correction and detection. It is possible to selectively enable interrupts only for some memory regions by using register flags for particular RAM ECC controller units.
- **Step 5.** Enable the global RAM ECC interrupts.

3.1.2  

**ECC ISR**

The interrupt service routine provides an opportunity to immediately react to an event of ECC error. The ISR implemented in CubeHAL generated in projects using STM32CubeMX tool is however just a start. The HAL ISR branches to a callback function. This function is not part of the HAL and this section proposes how it could be implemented.

The single-bit errors are automatically corrected by the ECC controller, but only in the data read. It is then necessary to write back the corrected data. In this case, the data and the address latching feature is very helpful. It is appropriate to write the corrected data back to its address. Failing to do so may result in a two-bit failure later (in the case of another bit within the same word is damaged).

If a two-bit error happen anyway, the subsequent action depends on what exactly was damaged. If the affected word is an instruction of code loaded to RAM, the load region within the original code in the flash memory must be identified and the code must be reloaded to the SRAM. The same kind of action is suitable for any other initialized section, for example a copy of the interrupt vector table.

In case of the damaged address falling into a stack area, to avoid further damage caused by executing in incorrect context, a system reset must be performed. If the affected word address lies within boundaries of data RAM (a heap or global variables), it is up to the developer to decide which action to take. Generally a reset is recommended, but risk analysis conclusion may differ case by case.
3.1.3 Interpreting FAR (failing address register)

The FAR (failing address register) is not showing the absolute address of the failure, but a relative location. The value in FADD[31:0] also points a word and not a byte. To compute the physical address of the failure use the following formula:

Address = Memory start address + FADD x word size in byte

For example AXI SRAM monitor FADD=0x2004 means 0x2400 0000 + 0x2004 x 8 = 0x2401 0020 (64-bit words)
But in SRAM1 monitor the FADD=0x2004 value interprets as 0x3000 0000 + 0x2004 x 4 = 0x3000 8010 (32-bit words).

3.1.4 Preventive actions for ECC in RAM

The RAM ECC events are random, hence some damage can be prevented by performing a periodic check on the used RAM area. The ECC check is activated by reading from each word; if the checkup period is appropriate, most erroneous words are detected while there is still only one wrong bit. An appropriate period can vary from hours to several days, it depends on the operating conditions, and the role of the microcontroller.

A preventive ECC checkup does not need to be completed in a single round. It is a background task that may be performed during idle moments, either by a background process or by a low-priority DMA transfers. A single loop or a DMA transfer is not possible as the SRAM is divided into non continuous address ranges.

The MDMA is particularly suited for this task, as it can access the ITCM/DTCM. When using the Cortex®-M7 CPU for memory check-by-read, the cache is involved (if cache is enabled). Accessing the SRAM through the Cortex®-M7 cache (so ITCM and DTCM are excluded from this rule), each read from memory fills the cache line of 256 bits. The loop that activates the ECC check on each memory word read only the first word of each 256-bit and the cache line loading continues with the remaining words. This action lowers the CPU load, but the bus remains heavily loaded.
3.2 Dealing with ECC errors in flash memory

Typical failures for the flash memory are fail due to memory cell wear and fail due to charge leakage. Some factors that might contribute to failure are interference from adjacent cell or voltage instability during programming. Unlike to SRAM, failure in certain flash memory address may indicate a slightly higher probability of a subsequent failure in the same page. Flash memory errors should be non-existent on a new device, with probability of failure increasing towards the end of projected lifetime. The flash memory lifetime depends mainly on temperature conditions and in the amount of erase cycles.

3.2.1 Flash memory ECC ISR

For flash memory, the interrupts that notify of an ECC error are included in the flash memory global interrupt vector. The ISR checks the flash memory status register FLASH_SR1 for ECC flags “single error correction” and “double error detection” and take the appropriate action (which depends on the flash memory use). As the interrupt vector is shared with normal flash memory operations (such as end of programming), the ISR should then pass control to HAL to deal with the other flags.

3.2.2 Flash memory code

The on-chip non-volatile memory is primarily intended to be used for code. The code is not likely to be frequently rewritten, so if a damage occurs it is most likely caused by aging and by charge leakage. On a dual-bank device it is possible to have a second copy of the same code and swap to this second copy when an ECC error is indicated. This solution implies that the health of both bank contents is monitored. It is possible to reprogram the failing contents of the other bank from the healthy bank, however there is no guarantee on how much this action might improve the device life expectancy.

3.2.3 EEPROM emulation

If the failing Flash memory cell is used to store data, the failure cause is likely to be linked to a program/erase cycling. Advanced EEPROM emulation implementations include mechanisms that deals with failing memory cells and are able to exclude them from the cycling. The application note EEPROM emulation techniques and software for STM32 microcontrollers(AN4894) deals with the problematic of EEPROM emulation including the ECC implications.

3.2.4 Preventive action for ECC in flash memory

The CRC hardware module is a useful tool to monitor the embedded flash memory health. CRC can check either the whole bank or a specific address range autonomously; ECC is implicitly checked on read as well. The program must then implement a reaction to a detected problem.
4 Conclusion

With a higher level of integration of the microelectronics in a system, memory cells are more prone to failure, hence ECC memory integrity protection becomes more important. The main difference between the RAM ECC compared to a regular peripheral is that the RAM ECC cannot be turned off as it is an integral part of the RAM interface.

This application note is a description of the ECC in RAM, flash memory and cache memory. It provides also procedures to deal with ECC errors in RAM and flash memory.
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<td>31-Mar-2022</td>
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<td>• Added Section 3.1.3 Interpreting FAR (failing address register)</td>
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